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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-3159 
_____________ 
 
ABDUVAKHOB ABDUKAKHAROVICH ALIMBAEV, 
        Petitioner 
  
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
       Respondent  
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A079-729-904) 
Immigration Judge: Charles M. Honeyman 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 3, 2019 
 
Before:   SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and MATEY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed June 25, 2019) 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Abduvakhob Alimbaev seeks review of the decision of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) denying his application for lawful permanent residency. Exercising 
limited review, and identifying no error of law, we will dismiss his petition. 
I. 
 Alimbaev’s case is before us for a third time with a correspondingly long history. 
See Alimbaev v. Att’y Gen., 872 F.3d 188 (3d. Cir. 2017) (“Alimbaev I”).1 Alimbaev I 
outlined the facts and we incorporate that background here. Id. at 190–94. In that 
decision, we concluded that the BIA had misapplied the standard of review applicable to 
the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) credibility determinations. We explained that Alimbaev’s 
credibility is important on at least two issues: first, whether he viewed terroristic videos; 
and second, whether he and his family are likely to face hardship if he is forced to leave 
the United States. So, we held, “[o]n remand, the BIA must reconsider those factors with 
due deference to the IJ’s factfinding before weighing the various positive and negative 
factors to make its ultimate discretionary decision on adjustment of status.” Id. at 201. 
 On remand, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s grant of withholding of removal and 
protection under the Convention against Torture (“CAT”). This time, the BIA explained 
that, even crediting the IJ’s findings of fact, Alimbaev still didn’t carry his burden of 
establishing that he warranted an adjustment of status. It did give “reduced weight” to 
                                                 
1 We remanded Alimbaev’s first appeal on the Government’s unopposed motion. 
Alimbaev v. Attorney Gen., 872 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2017). Because the Court did not 
issue an opinion in that appeal, we refer to our opinion in Alimbaev’s later appeal as 
Alimbaev I. 
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any hardship from Alimbaev’s possible separation from his wife because they married 
“more than 3 years after he was placed into removal proceedings,” so “the potential for 
separation was known prior to the marriage.” (App. 7). And the BIA discounted the 
hardship accompanying a return to Uzbekistan, because “the grant of withholding of 
removal and protection under the [CAT]” means he “is not in danger of being removed to 
Uzbekistan.” Id. 
 In addition, while it accepted the IJ’s finding that Alimbaev “lacked actual 
knowledge of the inaccuracies in his immigration applications,” the BIA still considered 
“the submission of inaccurate applications to be an adverse discretionary factor.” Id. The 
BIA also noted that the IJ “found that the circumstances surrounding [Alimbaev’s] 
admission into the United States [were] a negative factor.” Id. Balancing these equities 
against the possibility of family separation and the resulting emotional and financial 
hardships, the BIA declined to adjust Alimbaev’s status. Id. at 8. Alimbaev again timely 
petitioned for review. 
II. 
 When the BIA issues its own opinion, we review that decision, not the IJ’s. 
Cadapan v. Att’y Gen., 749 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2014). We review the BIA’s legal 
determinations de novo, including whether it properly applied clear error review to the 
IJ’s findings of fact. Mendoza-Ordonez v. Att’y Gen., 869 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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A. Jurisdiction 
 We have jurisdiction over final removal orders of the BIA subject to the 
limitations established in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).2 Review of “constitutional claims or 
questions of law” is permitted; reexamination of the evidence is not. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D); 
Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). The Government argues that 
we lack jurisdiction because Alimbaev only challenges the BIA’s decision on his status, 
and we agree. As noted in Alimbaev I, “we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s 
discretionary decision whether to grant Alimbaev’s adjustment application and the 
balancing of the positive and negative factors that underlie it.” 872 F.3d at 200. Attaching 
a legal label to a factual claim “will not confer us with jurisdiction.” Jarbough, 483 F.3d 
at 189. Each of Alimbaev’s arguments do just that. 
B. Alimbaev’s Claims 
 First, Alimbaev argues the BIA has tipped the scale against him by failing to 
consider favorable facts cited in prior stages of this case. He notes that, this time, the BIA 
failed to mention explicitly his strong ties to the United States, his payment of taxes, his 
property ownership, and the hardship his removal would cause his extended family. True 
enough, but the BIA’s precedents establish only that adjudicating a petition for 
adjustment of status is a case-by-case process, “requir[ing] consideration of all the facts 
                                                 
 2 We have jurisdiction despite the BIA’s remand of Alimbaev’s petition to the IJ 
for background checks. Although remand to an administrative agency is not ordinarily a 
final order permitting appellate jurisdiction, “an order is final for jurisdictional purposes 
when a removability determination has been made that is no longer appealable to the 
BIA.” Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 195–96 (3d Cir. 2008). That is the case here. 
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and circumstances involved.” Matter of Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 195 (B.I.A. 1990). 
This requires balancing, not exhaustive recitation. See id. The BIA’s decision here 
satisfies those requirements, and neither we nor Alimbaev are aware of authority 
specifically requiring the BIA to list every factor relevant to its decisionmaking. So 
Alimbaev’s first challenge has no basis in the law. 
 Second, Alimbaev disagrees with the weight the BIA assigned to the potential 
hardship to him and his family. None dispute that Alimbaev remarried after removal 
proceedings started. But Alimbaev sees colorable error in the BIA’s decision to grant less 
weight to the hardship suffered by his wife because she knew removal was possible when 
they married. Similarly, he argues that merely being subject to a removal order creates an 
untenable risk of actual removal to a country within the reach of the Uzbek government, 
and thus the risk of arrest and torture. Both arguments are not challenges under the law; 
they ask us to re-weigh the hardship Alimbaev and his family might suffer if he is 
removed. As explained in Alimbaev I, “the BIA is entitled to assign the weight it sees fit 
to adjustment factors like a petitioner’s familial status, and its subsequent balancing of 
those factors is beyond the purview of our jurisdiction to consider.” 872 F.3d at 200, 
n.10. 
 Finally, Alimbaev objects to the BIA’s references to inaccuracies in his prior 
applications for adjustment, noting that the IJ concluded that he was unaware of the 
errors. We addressed this claim in Alimbaev I, where we recited the IJ’s finding that the 
circumstances surrounding his applications were “disturbing and negative, but not 
sufficient to cumulatively outweigh the positive equities in this case.” Id. at 200, n.10. 
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While the BIA needed to defer to the factual findings of the IJ, it acted “well within its 
rights” when it “assigned greater significance to the inaccurate immigration applications 
when adjudicating Alimbaev’s application for adjustment of status than did the IJ.” Id. As 
before, we see no colorable claim sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction. 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review. 
